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Turkmenistan at the Last Stage of Perestroika. 
Determinants of an Authoritarian Path1
Slavomír Horák*
Introduction
The last two years of Turkmenistan within the ussr clearly demons-
trated a tendency of transformation from Soviet style to another form of 
authoritarian development, in this case under the guidance of one single 
person. Despite the fact that the First Secretary Saparmurat Niyazov was 
selected to his position as a supporter of perestroika, his steps inside the 
Soviet republic rather slowed down the process. His negative attitude 
toаarНs pОrОstroТФa anН glasnost аas Пullв МonirmОН bв СТs stОps aПtОr tСО 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The transition became one of the core paradigms for the analysis of 
the trajectories of post-Soviet states. As Thomas Caroters, the critique 
of the concept, pointed out, the transformation from the Soviet system 
assumed an inevitable shift towards liberalisation or democracy with a 
key role being played by the election processes (Caroters, 2002, pp. 6-9). 
1 The text was created within Charles University grant project prvouk p17. The author 
is grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their thorough review and extraordinary 
number of commentaries and remarks, which helped to improve substantially the initial 
version of the text.
* Slavomír Horák is a research fellow at the Department of Russian and East European 
Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles 
University in Prague. He focuses on contemporary political, social and economic issues 
in Central Asia with special focus on Turkmenistan’s domestic issues, especially informal 
politics and state- and nation-building. Contact: slavomir.horak@post.cz.
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CarotОrs, СoаОvОr, НТН not rОsОarМС tСО СТstorТМal spОМТiМs oП ОaМС “transТ-
tion” country. The immediate historical conditions at the time of (or shortly 
before) the “breakthrough event” (ussr dissolution in this case) should 
be taken into consideration as decisive factors in the subsequent develop-
ment of the country. In this context, I argue that the various shifts during 
perestroika (both long-term and short-term during the last years of this 
period) determined substantially the trajectory of its further development. 
Each Soviet republic (or region in some cases) underwent different paths 
аТtСТn tСТs pОrТoН. TСО rОal rОПormТst voТМОs НТvОrsОlв ТnluОnМОН lТПО Тn 
the appropriate republics and the leadership of each republic reacted in a 
different way from that of the centre. Therefore, the analysis of perestroika 
in Turkmenistan serves as an example of why the country’s transition 
undertook a regressive rather than a progressive path.
In an attempt to understand which long-term and immediate factors 
impacted the further development of the country, the text focuses on the 
following issues: the situation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic 
(ssr) in the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev period and the character as 
well as the composition of the intra-Turkmen elite, which enabled (with 
the support of Moscow) the rule of a single person, in this case Niyazov. 
Consequently, once single person rule with his individual character is ins-
talled, it determines the character of the regime itself. From this standpoint, 
the selection of Saparmurat Niyazov as the First Secretary and subsequent 
МaНrО rОsСuПlОs maНО altОrnatТvО аaвs oП НОvОlopmОnt МomplТМatОН anН 
even improbable. This process depends substantially on the president’s 
background and personal character. It leads me to the thesis that 1989-1991 
were decisive years determining the current character of Turkmenistan’s 
political system and political culture without any alternative paths. Even 
the second president, who grew up politically under the regime, was not 
able and probably was not even willing to change fundamentally the sys-
tem established by his predecessor. Therefore, the political culture created 
Тn TurФmОnТstan at tСО bОgТnnТng oП tСО 1990s ТnluОnМОН tСО ТnНОpОnНОnt 
Turkmenistan for several decades ahead.
In tСО irst part tСО ПoМus oП tСО tОбt Тs on tСО sТtuatТon Тn SovТОt 
Turkmenistan before perestroika. The internal formal and informal poli-
tТМs Тn tСО rОpublТМ aМquТrОН Тts oаn spОМТiМs basОН on tСО МonsОrvatТon 
of cadres under Muhammetnazar Gapurov, then the First Secretary of 
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the Communist Party of the Turkmen ssr from 1969 to 1985. As in other 
republics in the Soviet Union, the conservation of and request for stability 
resulted in a political culture full of cronyism and preference for “one’s 
own” circles. The change of leader in 1985 to Saparmurat Niyazov led to 
substantial changes in the republican leadership, with the cadres trying to 
cement their newly acquired position. It was one of the principal reasons 
for further conservation of power in the republic and a barrier to the esta-
blishment of more visible alternative structures and informal groups, as 
was the case with other Soviet republics in the later 1980s.
Nevertheless, attempts to establish alternative groups to the power 
also appeared in Turkmenistan. The second part of this text analyses the 
growth of these groups and their main issues for discussion, as well as 
their interaction with the powers, with Niyazov as the head of the latter. 
This part is not able to provide an exhaustive analysis of the alternatives 
to Niyazov, which is the topic of another article (Kališevskij, 2014). It 
rather tries to show the growing authoritarianism of Niyazov, which fully 
unfolded after independence and the loss of upper control from the Soviet 
centre. Niyazov’s reaction to the alternative groups varied from case to 
case and oscillated between the incorporation of their programmes into his 
own agenda (and consequent marginalisation of his opponents), to their 
repression. Generally, it seems that Niyazov tolerated any alternatives to 
СТs poаОr onlв tОmporarТlв anН СО usОН tСО irst opportunТtв to gОt rТН oП 
tСОm, ОvОn Тn tСО inal stagОs oП tСО ОбТstОnМО oП tСО SovТОt UnТon. TСО 
dissolution of the ussr and the proclamation of independence fully opened 
the way to enforce Niyazov’s political views, which did not tolerate any 
alternative or even opposition.
The last part of the study shows how the personal character of Niyazov 
helped to establish an authoritarian political culture intolerant towards any 
alternative view. This situation determined the path of Turkmenistan for a 
long time ahead.
The problem with carrying out studies on current Turkmenistan is that 
researchers must struggle with a relatively small number of resources. In 
particular, Šokhrat Kadyrov, a Turkmen historian and demographer and 
currently a Moscow-based researcher, has extensively examined the elites 
of Turkmenistan in its historical dynamic, including the late-Soviet period 
(Kadyrov, 1996, 2001a, 2003a, 2009). However, the questions of political 
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culture within the political elites and the personal character of the leader 
were mostly beyond the scope of his interests. The political culture of 
Soviet and post-Soviet Turkmenistan, including the phenomena of corrup-
tion, nepotism and cronyism, are only selectively researched (Rashid, 1994; 
BotсФov, 2007). TСО problОms oП latО-SovТОt ОlТtО ПormatТon arО also rОlОМ-
tОН Тn sОvОral tОбts anН mОmorТОs oП ПormОr polТtТМal igurОs anН aМtТvТsts oП 
that period (Kuliev, 2001 & 2006; Demidov, 2000 & 2002; Ryblov, 2004; 
ÈsОnov, 2008; RačФov, 2015).2 Some information for this study comes 
from interviews with several members of the Turkmenistan opposition 
(particularly with Avdy Kuliev), or journalists coming from Turkmenistan 
(Viktor Panov). In particular, I acknowledge the interviews with staff at 
the Memorial Centre in Moscow, especially Vitalij Ponomarev), who also 
provided me with several sources from the beginning of the 1990s. As the 
ПormatТon oП polТtТМal МulturО anН nОа аaвs oП tСТnФТng arО irmlв МonnОМ-
ted with political psychology (psychology of the leader), I am also grateful 
to my colleague Jiri Sipek from the Department of Psychology, Charles 
University, in Prague. He shared with me his ideas on the psychology of 
authoritarian leaders. Based on the information about Turkmenistan, he 
brought valuable reconstruction of Saparmurat Niyazov-Turkmenbashi’s, 
as well as the current president’s, ways of thinking. Unfortunately, the 
interviews with political, social and cultural activists, an important part of 
the research, were not conducted due to lack of time within the deadline for 
the journal and an absence of technical tools, which I admit as one of the 
main heuristic problems of the work. However, for the next deeper analysis 
oП tСО TurФmОn opposТtТon, tСТs gap аТll obvТouslв bО illОН.
Intra-Elite Struggles in the Turkmen ssr and its Consequences 
Before Perestroika
In tСО BrОгСnОv pОrТoН, stabТlТtв аas proМlaТmОН unoПiМТallв as tСО 
most decisive factor of the cadres’ policy, particularly in the Central Asian 
area (Willerton, 1987; Miller, 1977). The First Secretaries of the respective 
republican Communist Party were appointed for a long time period in the 
1960s. The maintenance of stability in the Soviet Republic was one of their 
principal tasks. For this reason, the leaders were either from the close circle 
2 Another newly published book of memories with a lot of new information remained 
beyond the reach of the author: Èsenov, 2015.
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of Brezhnev (such as Sharaf Rashidov in Uzbekistan, who ruled over the 
republic from 1958), or from some particular informal group from within 
the republic. The balance of the elite group was one of the key factors 
in the appointment of Muhammetnazar Gapurov for the position of First 
Secretary in the Turkmen ssr in 1969. Turkmen historian Šokhrat Kadyrov 
points out that the nomination of the new Secretary in the Turkmen ssr 
аas onО oП tСО latОst аТtСТn BrОгСnОv’s rОsСuПlО oП tСО МaНrОs, Уust aПtОr 
the consolidation of Brezhnev’s position in the centre and together with 
the decreasing position of the then-First Secretary Balyš Ovezov. He was 
replaced and later sacked by Gapurov (Kadyrov, 2003a, pp. 130-131).
Gapurov was an experienced member of the Communist Party establish- 
ment and previously the head of the Turkmen ssr Cabinet of Ministers. 
He was also the representative of the non-Ashgabat elite group. His posi-
tion had to balance the central Akhal-Teke group, which had tried in vain 
to achieve the highest position in the republic since the beginning of the 
1950s (Kadyrov, 2005). A non-Akhal-Teke ruler in Akhal-Teke Ashgabat 
(and its surroundings) served as the loyalty guarantee of the First Secretary 
to the Moscow centre. Muhammetnazar Gapurov understood the threat 
coming from the Ashgabat elite group. The only option for keeping power 
over the place was to use protectionist politics towards his kin, who were 
fully entrenched in the political culture of non-elite Turkmen hierarchy 
(Botâkov, 2007, p. 150). As a result, Ashgabatis and Akhal-Tekes were 
sвstОmatТМallв rОmovОН Пrom ТnluОntТal posТtТons Тn tСО rОpublТМan appa-
ratus or even eliminated from the political, social or cultural life in the 
irst СalП oП tСО 1970s (KaНвrov, 2001a, pp. 348-350; 2003, pp. 131-132). 
In this regard, we should mention the process with the Turkmen cultural 
elite, including, for example, the leading Turkmen poetess Annasoltan 
Kekilova (Rashid, 1994, p. 195), the leading writer Berdy Kerbabaev and 
many others.
TСО purgОs promotОН tСО ПavourТtОs oП Gapurov Тnto ТnluОntТal posТ-
tions. They also included the cadres from other regions, such as Yomuts 
(AnnamuСammОt KlвčОv, tСО long-tОrm СОaН oП tСО TurФmОn ssr Supreme 
Soviet Presidium in 1963-1978), or Mary-Teke (Maâ Mollaeva, the 
Central Committee Secretary for Ideology), or Northern Turkmenistan 
(Bally Âzkuliev, the deputy head of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1975-
1978, Turkmen ssr Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1978-1987) (Kadyrov, 
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2001a, p. 349; Sitnânskij, 2011). The Akhal-Teke were, however, also 
rОprОsОntОН Тn tСО СТgСОst, albОТt not tСО most ТnluОntТal, posТtТons Тn tСО 
rОpublТМ. In tСТs rОgarН, Čarв KarrвОv, onО oП tСО most Тmportant igurОs 
in Ashgabat with a wide range of kins within the Akhal-Teke elite, could 
sОrvО as tСО ОбamplО (KaНвrov, 2001a, p. 180; RačФov, 2015). At tСО samО 
time, trying to demonstrate his loyalty to the Central Committee and to 
Brezhnev personally, he continued to maintain the politics of subservience 
and corruption towards his patrons in Moscow. There were rumours about 
wagons of fruits, nuts and rugs for the all-Union Communist Party Central 
Committee. His “contribution” to the pro-Moscow political culture also 
includes strengthening the position of the Russian language in the republic 
or the underlining of pro-Russian direction in Turkmenistan historiography. 
The Constitution of Turkmenistan adopted in 1978 did not contain any 
article about the superiority of the Turkmen language in the republic 
(Konstituciâ…, 1978). The promotion of the historical thesis on the 
“voluntary inclusion of Turkmen in Russia” became the second important 
ТssuО Тn tСТs iОlН, аСТМС ОnМountОrОН onlв rarО opposТtТon аТtСТn tСО ОlТtОs 
(Kadyrov, 2003a, pp. 133-135; Annanepesov, Roslâkov & Gapurov, 1984).
The Rise of Niyazov
Saparmurat Niyazov – the future First secretary – worked at the 
Communist Party of Turkmenistan Central Committee during Gapurov’s 
leadership. In 1980 he became the First Secretary of Communist Party  of the 
region of Ashgabat (obkom). His career was built and his political character 
was formed in the political culture of clientelism with preference given to 
the leader’s clan, as well as sycophantism, which served as his means of 
progress in the Party hierarchy, together with the right tribal and regional 
background (Aleksandrov, 1996, pp. 174-175). Such factors were adopted 
and developed under his rule for the reverse process – the promotion of an 
Akhal-Teke member into power. Niyazov also learned, since the time of his 
studies in the 1960s, how to use his orphan background for his own career 
promotion (Ryblov, 2004, p. 9). Although formally Akhal-Teke, he was not 
considered a real representative of this regional group.3 For this reason, he 
was found to be a suitable candidate for the position of First Secretary, 
3 NТвaгov аas aПilТatОН to JОаТsС (TollвОv, 2002), KurНТsС-IranТan (MТtroФСТn & 
Ponomarev, 1996) and even Arabic origin (Kadyrov, 2001b, p. 17).
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НОspТtО tСОrО bОТng morО ТnluОntТal rОprОsОntatТvОs oП AsСgabat, suМС as 
Čarв KarrвОv, tСО HОaН oП CabТnОt oП MТnТstОrs oП tСО rОpublТМ. TСО CОntral 
Committee of the Communist Party adopted the policy of replacement of 
the First Secretaries in the republics in order to break long-term clientelistic 
struМturОs. In tСТs МontОбt, NТвaгov bОМamО tСО irst rОprОsОntatТvО oП AФСal-
TОФО appoТntОН to tСО posТtТon oП tСО irst igurО Тn tСО rОpublТМ sТnМО 1951. 
Moscow was, however, not interested in the strengthening of this single 
group dominance within the republic. Niyazov, to a great extent “a stranger 
among СТs oаn pОoplО,” satТsiОН tСО AФСal-TОФО group anН, at tСО samО 
time, he was dependent on the Moscow legitimisation in Ashgabat, despite 
his alleged Akhal-Teke origin. The invitation of Niyazov to Moscow, an 
unprecedented step in the republican Communist Party’s practice, had to 
foster the loyalty of the First Secretary towards the centre.
Within the perestroika process, Niyazov was presented as the supporter 
of Gorbachev’s reforms. Niyazov apparently understood that his mission 
as the First Secretary was determined by Moscow in order to satisfy the 
demands of the Akhal-Teke regional group and, at the same time, maintain 
the position of the republican leader loyal to Moscow (Kadyrov, 2003a, 
pp. 135-137). He kept his loyalty to Gorbachev, when he had real power. 
Once Boris Yeltsin increased his position, Niyazov turned his support to 
him in the last months of the Soviet Union (Ryblov, 2004, p. 9). Inside 
the republic, however, he launched changes, traditional for a new leader, 
of the new Soviet republic’s leaders. These changes had two principal 
goals – ousting Gapurov and his allies and raising his authority within 
tСО AsСgabat ОlТtОs. Gapurov СaН bООn aММusОН oП nОpotТsm, lattОrв anН 
careerism (Rashid, 1994, p. 195). However, despite the removal of cadres 
connected with Gapurov, some spheres remained untouched. The security 
services, as well as the energy sector, were the most important spheres in 
which Akhal-Teke were underrepresented and remained under the direct 
control of Moscow.
Therefore, Niyazov behaved in the style of “the two-faces policy,” one 
for Moscow and the second for intra-Turkmenistan issues. In the latter 
case, he adopted the political culture well known to him based on the abo-
vОmОntТonОН МСaraМtОrТstТМs. TСО sвmbolТМ sТgnТiМanМО oП tСО appoТntmОnt 
oП NТвaгov Пor tСО AФСal-TОФО ОlТtО lОН to a igСt Пor posТtТon Тn tСО rОpublТМ 
within the Ashgabat elite and also led to it keeping its position, contrary 
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to reforms in the Soviet Union. Niyazov understood his role in the Soviet 
centre as well as his position within the Turkmen elite.
The Moscow purges of Central Asian and other Soviet Republic lea-
ders, in particular the “cotton affair” in the neighbouring Uzbekistan, also 
ТnluОnМОН NТвaгov anН СТs pОrsonal МСaraМtОr as polТtТМТan (LТpovsФв, 
1995). Cleaning the elite from the Gapurov period, Niyazov also understood 
that his best allies (both in Moscow and within the republic) could easily 
become his enemies. This paranoid approach and his own loneliness 
аТtСout a irm anМСor Тn tСО rОpublТМ lОН СТm to tСО posТtТon oП rОsТstanМО to 
any attempts at alternative development. Although newly appointed Akhal-
Teke groups supported this idea of stability, Niyazov preferred to act as if 
he had no allies or was only supported by occasional allies. He initiated a 
similar “cotton affair” within the republic, removing many important state 
igurОs Пrom tСОТr posТtТons (Rвblov, 2004, p. 21). ApparОntlв, СО НТН not 
want to repeat the fate of Rashidov’s cadres in neighbouring Uzbekistan.
The personal character of Niyazov has to be added to the abovemen-
tioned factors. Those who were in touch with him characterise him as cruel 
and demanding respect from his subordinates. He was not tolerant towards 
any alternative way of thinking or disagreement or challenge to his ideas 
(Rвblov, 2004, pp. 50-51; RačФov, 2015). On tСО otСОr СanН, СО аas 
considered to be sycophantic towards higher organs, such as the Central 
Committee of the Turkmen ssr Communist Party, the Central Committee 
of the ussr Communist Party, etc.4 He promoted his career using this 
approach to the authorities, also using his orphan status. As he was able to 
rise in his career, he required the same approach from his subordinates. He 
also surrounded himself with the people who always agreed with his ideas. 
Generally, he further developed the political culture existing already in 
Gapurov’s Turkmen ssr and contributed to it with his personal intolerant 
character. Niyazov’s system advanced the practice of vertical power, in 
which the lower level had to demonstrate its respect to the higher level of 
power (including material presents and bribes), while the highly positioned 
person had a neglectful attitude to the lower one.
4 Description of the personal character of Niyazov was provided to the author by several 
pОoplО Пrom СТs ПormОr ОntouragО Тn tСО irst вОars oП СТs rulО (A. KulТОv, ПormОr mТnТstОr 
of foreign affairs, 1999), or from business contacts (Czech businessmen conducting 
negotiations with Turkmenistan in 2004-2005).
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In sum, the political culture during Gapurov’s period (and even before 
him), together with cadre changes traditional in Turkmenistan after the 
appointment of a new First Secretary and the personal character of the 
new leader Saparmurat Niyazov, together created the mix of settings in 
which perestroika was taking place in Turkmenistan and also determined 
the political culture in post-Soviet Turkmenistan. These factors enabled 
Niyazov to suppress any opponents in the last stages of perestroika and the 
beginning of the independent period. Later on, this environment helped 
him to establish personal rule in the independent Turkmenistan.
Perestroika in Turkmenistan. The Last Chance for an Alterna-
tive to Authoritarianism?
Perestroika in Turkmenistan brought at least some chance to shift the 
political system in the country to bring it closer to reformist movement, as 
appeared in various parts of the Soviet Union (Baltic states, Georgia, or even 
Russia). However, the Turkmenistan case of perestroika and glasnost was 
НОtОrmТnОН bв sОvОral spОМТiМs. As mОntТonОН abovО, tСО МaНrО МСangОs 
promotОН AФСal-TОФО mТННlО-ranФТng poаОrПul igurОs Тnto tСО СТgСОst 
positions in the republic in the mid-1980s. These new rulers, including 
Niyazov, did not have much interest in dislodging the already established 
system. The political culture analysed above did not make the develop-
ment of reformist movements or even political fractions easy. The reform-
minded independent people, mostly from intelligentsia in the capital and 
fewer in the regions, were not able to gain powerful positions. Moreover, 
these representatives were often considered as representatives of Ashgabat 
(Akhal-Teke), with little support from other regions. As Kadyrov correctly 
points out, the representatives of the alternative groups often grew up and 
through in a different political culture (he calls it European), which caused 
their alienation from the political culture of the Turkmen elites (Kadyrov, 
2002a). In fact, these two different and opposite views on the develop-
ment of the Soviet republic put the alternative groups into opposition 
with the regime and its marginality in the substantial (and even politically 
ТnluОntТal) part oП tСО TurФmОn soМТОtв. MorОovОr, tСО polТtТМal МulturО 
of the elites, headed by Niyazov, was supported by power and media and 
administrative apparatus. The case of the dynamics of Agzybirlik, the most 
visible, albeit informal (at least from the beginning) movement established 
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in the Turkmen ssr, symptomatically shows this tendency and its fate was 
also repeated in other less important groups.
АСОn analвsТng tСО problОm oП tСО ТnПormal anН unoПiМТal groups 
advancing a type of Turkmen ssr НОvОlopmОnt altОrnatТvО to tСО oПiМТal 
МoursО, аО МoulН НОinО tСОm unНОr onО МatОgorв: “altОrnatТvО groups.” TСТs 
term could cover all the various instances that appeared in Turkmenistan. 
Although most authors writing about Turkmen perestroika (Rashid, 1994; 
Kadyrov, 2001a & 2003a; Peyrouse, 2012) called them “opposition,” in 
fact, many of the formal and informal members were in contact with or 
were even part of the establishment, which problematises their “opposi-
tion” dimension. This character was determined more clearly at the last 
stage of perestroika, when repressions were launched towards the repre-
sentatives of these groups, turning them into the real opposition or, on the 
contrary, the supporters of Niyazov. The groups – movements, informal 
groups or, at the last stage of ussr existence, also political parties and 
entities – were personally interconnected with each other. Many former 
Agzybirlik representatives were involved in other groups.
The initial concepts behind the creation of alternative movements were 
based on questions of reinterpretation of Turkmen language status and 
TurФmОn СТstorв. AММorНТng to RasСТН, tСО irst protОsts Тn AsСgabat tooФ 
place as early as 1987, when about 2,000 veterans of the Soviet Afghan 
МonlТМt tooФ to tСО strООts (RasСТН, 1994, p. 196), altСougС tСО ОvОnt tooФ 
plaМО аТtСТn tСО irst mООtТng oП AПgСan vОtОrans, ТnМluНТng a ПОstТval oП 
AПgСan songs (RožФov, 2015). HoаОvОr, tСТs onО-tТmО aМtТon НТН not СavО 
a long-term effect on the internal processes in Turkmenistan, despite the 
topicality of the Afghan issue for Turkmen society.
Apart from the Afghan problem, the question of the language became 
tСО irst rОal ФОв ТssuО Тn tСО pОrОstroТФa movements in Turkmenistan. 
Similar voices were heard in many other Soviet republics in which the local 
language was proclaimed as the primary one. Some Turkmen authors, even 
in 1990, supported the further process of Turkmenisation of the country 
and proposed the Latinisation of the Turkmen alphabet, moving back to 
the reforms of the 1930s (Clement, 2005, pp. 135-136). The language issue 
was also discussed on the important informal Turkmenistan intelligentsia 
meeting in April 1988, which resulted in vast interrogations with the orga-
nisers sanctioned by Niyazov (Ryblov, 2004, p. 25). The protest against 
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tСО oПiМТal ТntОrprОtatТon oП TurФmОnТstan СТstorв, НОinОН bв Gapurov as 
“Voluntary Turkmen Accession to Russia,” became yet another issue for 
discussion in the informal intellectual groups. At the same time, the mee-
tings and protests for various demands within the glasnost process became 
more common in Ashgabat and in the regions in May 1989, despite the ban 
on public meetings within the republic (Kadyrov, 2001a, pp. 42-43).
Both issues – interpretation of history and language – laid a funda-
mОntal quОstТon Пor tСО irst Тmportant altОrnatТvО group Тn TurФmОnТstan, 
Agzybirlik, which gathered about 600 intellectuals in September 1989 
following Niyazov’s expression on the language issues in the Central Press 
(Safronov, 2002). He also put the group under his control through his proxies 
at the Academy of Sciences. He pretended to be open to discussion with the 
intellectuals and to be ready to include some of the ideas of the movement 
on the republican agenda (Kadyrov, 2001a, p. 92). As a result, Niyazov 
announced the proposal of the Language Law in November 1989 (Ryblov, 
2004, p. 26). However, typical of his character, he apparently feared any 
altОrnatТvО movОmОnt or ТНОas. TСО irst opОn ОvОnt oП tСО AgгвbТrlТФ 
movement on the site of the Geok Tepe battle and fortress in January 1990 
МСallОngОН tСО oПiМТal ТntОrprОtatТon oП RussТan-TurФmОn rОlatТons anН 
demanded the establishment of a Memorial Day on 12 January, the date of 
tСО battlО. SuМС aМtТons aПirmОН NТвaгov’s НТsgust at anв lТbОral НТsМussТon. 
It demonstrated the ability of alternatives to organise real actions, which 
could, in the mind of Niyazov, turn out to be a real political challenge. 
It convinced him of the necessity to behave less tolerantly towards the 
movement. This demonstration became the starting point for further and 
increasing suppression of the activists and alternatives. Agzybirlik became 
for him the symbol of the opposition, as although many of those blamed 
for the support or membership of the movement were in fact not connected 
with it (Starodymov, 2012). As such, Agzybirlik represented an important 
challenge for the regime and the stability of those Akhal-Teke who were 
irmlв МonnОМtОН аТtС tСОТr rОМОntlв gaТnОН posТtТons.
Niyazov also took the initiative and proposed the Language Law in 
November 1989. Although the law was not adopted, Niyazov lately usur-
ped fully the concern about the Turkmen language (Turkmenbashi, 2001, 
pp. 186 & 299-300; Niâzov, 1994, p. 17). He also adopted the initiative 
concerning the Geok Tepe battle. Although in 1990 the demonstration of 
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Agzybirlik was broken up by the power structure, a year later it was alle-
gedly Niyazov’s initiative to establish a National Memorial day (Hatyra 
Günü), which turned out later to be another manifestation of loyalty to the 
president (Kadyrov, 2003b, p. 114; Horák, 2015).
The Agzybirlik movement in 1989 was probably the most extensive 
and the most visible attempt to create an alternative to Niyazov’s rule 
and increasing Akhal-Teke dominance, even if many of the Agzybirlik 
followers were also part of the Akhal-Teke. However, the movement 
was formed mostly within Ashgabat intelligentsia consisting primarily of 
“RussТiОН lОvОls oП EuroturФmОn ОlТtОs” (KaНвrov, 2003a). TСО problОm 
with Agzybirlik was, as one of its founders and later political emigrant 
Akmurad Velsapar pointed out, its overemphasis on democratic values 
and, consequently, a kind of intellectual introversion. The potential suppor-
ters from Ashgabat and, more particularly, from the regions and Ashgabat 
surroundings, demanded more nationalistic or Islamic renaissance rheto-
ric (Velsapar, 1997). The narrow group of intellectuals did not represent 
Turkmen society, especially the substantial non-Akhal-Teke part outside 
the capital, who mostly perceived them through the lenses of tribalism and 
considered them as the representative of another expression of Akhal-Teke 
hegemonism. Akmurad Velsapar also noticed that people from the regions 
were not represented at any potential meeting in Ashgabat (“foreign” terri-
tory for them), if they do not dominate in opposition movement (Velsapar, 
1997, cited by Kadyrov, 2003a, p. 148). The society in Turkmenistan 
became more fragmented than Agzybirlik supposed. Therefore, the impor-
tant democratic slogans and refusal to serve as more radical nationalists 
or followers of Islamic renaissance split the movement and its represen-
tatives from its potential supporters. As one moderate critic of Agzybirlik 
remarked, they generally considered the shift towards more nationalism 
unattractive to other levels of Turkmen society (Starodymov, 2012). It 
made it easier for the regime to gradually reduce and later suppress the 
movement. The powers intervened during both attempts to transform the 
group to an oПiМТal movОmОnt or ОvОn a polТtТМal partв Тn MarМС 1991 anН 
January 1992 (Kadyrov, 2002b). The movement was only able to appeal to 
the public to vote for the preservation of the ussr during the referendum in 
1991 (Kadyrov, 2001a, p. 44).
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Other groups that could be considered as alternative were found at 
the end of the Soviet Union and at the time when Niyazov managed to 
consolidate his power together with his Party and State organs’ repressive 
machine. He could rely on the strong mandate given by the non-alternative 
elections in October 1990, where Niyazov obtained 98.3% of the votes. It 
cleared the way for suppression of any alternative group potentially able 
to challenge his rule.
The latter was a case of an attempt to establish an initiative group 
supporting the so-called Democratic Reforms Movement (Dviženie 
demokratičeskikh reform) in Moscow under the leadership of several 
former Communist Party representatives and other activists (Eduard 
SСОvarНnaНгО, AlОбanНr ÂФovlОv, GavrТl Popov, AnatolТУ SobčaФ, ОtМ.). 
Turkmen group creation was silenced from the very beginning and the ini-
tiators of the group in Ashgabat had to go through “prophylactic interview” 
with the Party and Power structures (Ryblov, 2004, pp. 19-20).
In 1991, the famous journalist and philosopher Muhammedmurad 
Salamatov launched the political and social journal Daсnč. TСО irst 
issue was ready in September 1991 and was published in Moscow at the 
beginning of 1992. However, the journal was prohibited in Turkmenistan 
and the printouts of it (as well as other issues titled Daсnč-èkspress) were 
МonisМatОН Тn AsСgabat. TСО autСors аСo agrООН to МontrТbutО tСОТr tОбts Тn 
the journal came mostly from the Agzybirlik and other alternative groups. 
Many people from the intelligentsia of that time refused contribution to the 
journal as it presented open anti-Niyazov views (Berdyev, 2006). In 1995, 
Salamatov became more famous for another article entitled “Kto khozâin 
v Turkmenistane” [Who rules in Turkmenistan] in the journal Turkmeny. 
Al’manakh (cited by Kadyrov, 2001a, p. 254). A similar fate affected the dis-
cussion club Pajkhas, created at the Academy of Sciences. The group reached 
only a limited public and its initiator Šokhrat Kadyrov became famous for 
his later article about the 1992 Turkmenistan constitution (Ryblov, 2004, 
p. 45) and was subsequently forced to emigrate from the country.
Within the political system of expansion of Niyazov’s regime in 1990-
1992, Agzybirlik and other groups could not aspire to gain much success, 
even if they were able to attract more supporters. The group was labelled 
as natТonalТstТМ Тn tСО oПiМТal prОss anН Тts mОmbОrs startОН to bО pОrsО-
cuted following the ban of the group in January 1990 (Kadyrov, 2002b). 
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Ideologically, Niyazov adopted some of the most important topics of the 
potОntТallв most ТnluОntТal altОrnatТvО groups. OpОn arrОst аas applТОН Пrom 
1990. Širali Nurmuradov, one of the leaders of Agzybirlik, was detained in 
OМtobОr tСat вОar bОПorО tСО irst prОsТНОntТal ОlОМtТons (Anonвmous, 2006; 
InПormaМТonnвУ CОntr …, s.Н.). SomО igurОs Пrom AgгвbТrlТФ anН otСОr 
movements who attempted to express their opinions in more open Moscow 
media were often subject to the “prophylactic interviews” back in Ashgabat 
or even dismissed from their positions (Rashid, 1994, p. 196). The Writers 
Union of Turkmenistan, which was potentially considered as one of the 
centres of alternative views (as expressed in the journal Èdebiât ve sungat 
[Literature and art] was silenced during the February 1991 congress when 
Niyazov dismissed its chief editor Aširkuli Bajriev and incorporated his 
favourites to the leadership of the Union. Even if some writers tried to adapt 
soft power through protest or hunger strikes, it had no results against the 
growing repressive machine of the regime in 1991 (Ryblov, 2004, pp. 26-27).
The attempts to create alternative political parties occurred in 1991 
or after the ussr dissolutions, that is at the time of full consolidation of 
Niyazov’s regime. Agzybirlik tried to establish itself as a national move-
mОnt but аas НОinТtТvОlв bannОН (KaНвrov, 2001a, p. 92, Agzybirlik…, 
1991). Part of the Agzybirlik movement attempted to create the Party 
of Democratic Development (Partiс demokratičeskogo raгvitiс 
Turkmenistana) Тn 1991 аТtС DurНвmuraН KСoНžamuСammОНov as tСО 
head of the party (Torkunov, 2012, p. 518). However, the party was not 
registered and its leader was later arrested and placed in a psychiatric hos-
pital (Mitrokhin & Ponomarev, 1999).
Another alternative group, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan 
(Demokratičeskaс partiс Turkmenistana), was formed under the leadership 
of Muhammed Durdymurad, but its activities were banned in 1991 and the 
partв СaН to СolН Тts irst МongrОss Тn MosМoа. TСО partв strТМtlв rОПusОН 
their ban after the Moscow coup in August 1991 (Vasil’eva, 1991), but, as 
RasСТН poТnts out, СТs mОssagО oП unТiМatТon oП all TurФТМ pОoplО НТН not 
even reach Central Asia or Turkmenistan (Rashid, 1994, p. 196). Other 
experiments with the establishment of political parties were organised in 
1992; the Agrarian Party, the Communist Party, Agzybirlik, as well as the 
Russian Society of Turkmenistan, had ambitions to participate in the future 
elections. All of these attempts were nipped in the bud as they were often 
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not ablО to organТsО tСО irst stОps toаarНs tСОТr rОМognТtТon or tСОТr applТ-
cations were not answered (Kališevskij, 2014).
In tСО irst вОars oП ТnНОpОnНОnМО, somО rОprОsОntatТvОs oП tСО altОrnatТvО 
movements did not lose hope of resistance to Niyazov’s regime, co-existence 
and even dialogue with him. The last open protests were suppressed in 
1994-1995. The regime involved the whole range of the repressive appa-
ratus in order to cut down any alleged opposition activities (Saparov, 
2000; Safronov, 2002). The remaining proponents of the alternative way 
of thinking were forced to emigrate, were persecuted or even disappeared 
(Kamalova, Vital’ev & Šilds, 2006). The process of a repressive approach 
towards former opponents continued throughout Niyazov’s tenure, right up 
to his death in 2006.
Conclusion: Perestroika as Unsuccessful Attempt to Change 
Turkmen Political Culture
Ahmed Rashid considered Turkmenistan as potentially one of the most 
unstable states within Central Asia (Rashid, 1994, p. 205). However, it 
seems that the authoritarian path chosen by Niyazov, accompanied by the 
harsh repression against any alternative, meant it became one the funda-
ments for its long-term stability. Niyazov consolidated his power, elimi-
nated the most important opponents and scared off any potential challen-
gers. Niyazov himself created personal rule in order to keep his position 
in the Akhal-Teke surroundings (Aleksandrov, 1996, p. 175; Horák, 2010). 
The political culture based on cronyism, corruption and nepotism helped 
him to cement the authoritarian structures.
Niyazov was able to use all his administrative and power resources 
to lТmТt tСО potОntТal ТnluОnМО oП altОrnatТvО МОntrОs Тn tСО last вОars oП 
tСО SovТОt UnТon, аТtС no ТnluОntТal rОaМtТon Пrom MosМoа. AltСougС 
intellectual groups were able to partly express their thoughts and reach 
the public through their publications and articles in the Turkmen and, even 
morО so, MosМoа prОss, tСОТr ТnluОnМО аas too аОaФ to МСallОngО tСО 
existing regime. Even if all the alternative centres were able to unite, they 
would hardly be able to correct the authoritarian rule of Niyazov based on 
the Soviet Turkmen political culture and his intolerant character. The pro-
gramme and the topics based on the moderate and (in some cases) radical 
TurФmОn natТonalТsm НТН not inН nОМОssarв rОaМtТon Тn tСО rОgТons anН 
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even beyond the narrow Ashgabat circles. As Akmurad Velsapar pointed 
out, “the history of Agzybirlik is the history of tragic opposition of leading 
representatives of Turkmen intelligentsia against Soviet totalitarianism” 
(cited by Salamatov, 1997). In this sense, it was the case not only of the 
SovТОt totalТtarТan rОgТmО, but ОvОn morО so tСО spОМТiМ SovТОt polТtТМal 
МulturО Тn tСО spОМТiМ TurФmОnТstan МonНТtТons.
In contrast to other more turbulent Soviet republics, there was only a 
small amount of mobilisation potential that would be able to challenge 
Niyazov’s emerging power. The ruling elites from the Akhal-Teke region 
did not support the intelligentsia as the decisive members among them 
were interested mostly in keeping their seats gained during the last Soviet 
purges in the mid-1980s. These cadres tended rather to conserve than to 
innovate the system.
Moreover, President Niyazov, based on his personal background (as an 
orphan) and characteristics, his political experience as well as the political 
culture he grew up in did not allow an increase in alternative or even oppo-
sition moods. Until the very end of Gorbachev’s leadership, he pretended 
to bО a supportОr oП pОrОstroТФa, аСТlО on СТs СomО iОlН СО supprОssОН 
any expression of it. After the interruption of Moscow support, he had, 
in his view, no other way to keep the rule but the crackdown on alterna-
tТvО movОmОnts as аОll as on tСО most promТnОnt igurОs oП tСО TurФmОn 
elite with other points of view. They were all considered by him to be an 
unnecessary challenge and competition (Kuliev, 2006). On the ideological 
level he usurped the opposition’s topics and presented them as his own. He 
relied mostly on himself to repress and adapt the ideas of his opponents, 
while he did not trust the people around him (mostly Akhal-Teke). In this 
way, the political culture based on the only and central person by means 
of a personality cult and repressive apparatus was set up as the regular 
Turkmenistan. This culture was adopted by the second president, who 
mostly strengthened Akhal-Teke hegemonism, making any alternative 
(opinion, region) almost impossible.
All in all, it does not mean that many people in Turkmenistan are not 
ready to think in democratic terms and select an alternative to the ruling 
rОgТmО. HoаОvОr, tСО polТtТМal МulturО ОstablТsСОН bв tСО irst prОsТНОnt anН 
prolonged in adapted form by the second one is not ready to provide such 
an option to the population.
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Abstract
This article focuses on the power shifts in Turkmenistan between the rule of 
Muhammetnazar Gapurov, the long-term First Secretary of the Turkmen ssr 
Communist Party and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The special focus is 
on the transformation of the elite, power structures and political culture under 
Saparmurat Niyazov and the emergence and struggle of the alternative groups 
trying to challenge the order established under the last First Secretary. It argues 
that Niyazov developed the political culture set up under Gapurov, adding his per-
sonal character to the process. These factors determined the largely unsuccessful 
attempt of the alternative and opposition groups to change the Turkmen ssr in the 
last stagОs oП pОrОstroТФa. TСО polТtТМal МulturО ОstablТsСОН Тn tСОsО anН tСО irst 
subsequent years within independent Turkmenistan also determined the character 
of the Turkmen regime and the composition of the elite for many years ahead, with 
sТgnТiМant ТmpaМt on tСО sвstОm unНОr tСО sОМonН prОsТНОnt BОrНТmuСamОНov.
Keywords: Turkmenistan, perestroika, Turkmen ssr, Saparmurat Niyazov, elites, 
political culture, opposition
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Résumé
Le Turkménistan р la dernière étape de la perestroïka. Les déterminants d’une 
voie autoritaire.
Cet article traite des changements de pouvoir au Turkménistan entre le régime 
de Muhammetnazar Gapurov, Premier Secrétaire du Parti communiste de la rss 
turkmène et la dissolution de l’Union soviétique. L’accent est mis sur la trans-
formation de l’élite, des structures de pouvoir et de la culture politique sous 
Saparmurat Niyazov et l’émergence et la lutte des groupes alternatifs tentant de 
contester l’ordre établi sous le dernier Premier Secrétaire. Il soutient l’idée que 
Niyazov a développé la culture politique mise en place sous Gapurov, en y ajou-
tant son caractère personnel au processus. Ces facteurs ont déterminé la tentative 
largement infructueuse des groupes alternatifs et d’opposition de changer la rss 
turkmène dans les dernières étapes de la perestroïka. La culture politique établie 
au cours de ces années et des premières années du Turkménistan indépendant a 
également déterminé le caractère du régime turkmène et la composition de l’élite 
pour lОs annцОs ПuturОs, avОМ un ТmpaМt sТgnТiМatТП sur lО sвstчmО sous lО sОМonН 
président Berdimuhamedov.
Mots-clцs : Turkménistan, perestroïka, rss turkmène, Saparmurat Niyazov, élites, 
culture politique, opposition
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